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Abstract
This paper analyzes the pattern of consumption taxes in a two period model with habit
formation and myopia. Individuals second period needs increase with their rst pe-
riod consumption. However, myopic individuals do not see this habit formation relation
when they take their saving decision. The rst-best solution is decentralized by a simple
Pigouvian(paternalistic) consumption tax (along with suitable lump-sum taxes). In a
second-best setting, when personalized lump-sum transfers are not available, consump-
tion taxes may have conicting paternalistic and redistributive e¤ects. Taxes should
discourage consumption of goods that entail negative externalities (unforeseen habits),
but discourage less the consumption of goods that are proportionately consumed by
individuals with high net social marginal utility of income. We also show that both
myopic and farsighted individuals benet more from the second-best policy when the
proportion of myopic agents in society increases.
JEL codes: D91, H21, H55
Keywords: Habit formation, myopia, projection bias, postponing retirement.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the e¤ect of (rational or myopic) habit formation on la-
bor supply and particularly on the retirement decision. It also examines how
this phenomenon a¤ects the design of commodity taxation. Empirical macro-
economists studying time series models of aggregate consumption expenditure
have long been puzzled by the signicant role that lagged consumption plays
in explaining current consumption, irrespective of the other variables (such as
income, assets and interest rates) that enter the estimated equations. As early
as 1952, T. M. Brown obtained impressive empirical results and suggested
habit persistence as the explanation for his ndings. Later on, Muellbauer
(1988) has studied how to add habit persistence to the life-cycle model. He
has distinguished two versions of habit formation, rational and myopic: in the
former, consumers are aware of the relationship between current consumption
and future tastes, while in the latter they are not and are constantly being
surprised even if they forecast their budget constraints accurately (p. 50).
Muellbauer (1988) studies the implications of these two versions of habit for-
mation for the Euler equation and applies his model to US data. The evidence
he obtains favors the hypothesis of myopic habit formation.
There is surprisingly little literature on the implications of (myopic or ratio-
nal) habit formation for optimal public policies such as taxation. As a matter
of fact, this theme of habit formation has been rediscovered quite recently by
the literature on happiness. The puzzle emerging from these studies is that,
although richer people tend to report being happier than poorer people in most
countries, inter-country comparisons do not show that increases in aggregate
income are associated with higher aggregate happiness. Looking at micro evi-
dence based on experiments, authors such as Layard (2005) conclude that two
phenomena are at play: what he calls rivalry (in assessing how happy they
are, people make relative comparisons with their peers this would explain
why richer people feel happier than poorer people in any given country) and
habit (people get accustomed to any consumption level, which would explain
why on average richer countries do not seem happier than poorer countries).
Layard (2005) goes further than his predecessors by challenging the profes-
sion to analyze the consequences of these two phenomena on optimal public
policies, as the title of his contribution makes clear: Rethinking public eco-
nomics: the implications of rivalry and habit. He points out, among other
things, that distortions arise with habit formation only if the habituation
e¤ect is not foreseen(p.8). There is other recent evidence for myopic habit
formation, such as Fehr and Sych (2008) and Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998).
Our contribution relies on two concepts, habit formation and myopia, that
are introduced in a two period model.1 Individual labor supply is xed and
unitary in the rst period; in the second one, it is endogenous and can be
viewed as the retirement age. In the rst period, individuals consume a cer-
tain fraction of their earnings. This provides some utility but creates future
needs or habits in the second period. However, we assume that out of myopia
or ignorance, individuals underestimate the extent of this habit formation.
Consequently, when they reach the second period, they face unexpected con-
sumption needs along with insu¢ cient saving, which may force them to work
longer than expected. This is in line with a recent paper by Maestas (2007)
which nds that one out of ve U.S. retirees unexpectedly return to work.
With habit formation and myopia, there is a case for government interven-
tion since myopic agents come to regret their past decisions.2 With identical
individuals, it su¢ ces for the government to induce more saving or to tax rst
period consumption. With individuals di¤ering in earnings, and in the absence
of lump sum transfers, our linear tax instruments play two roles: correction
for myopia and redistribution. Taxes should discourage consumption of goods
that entail negative externalities that are not internalized (unforeseen habits3)
but discourage less the consumption of goods that are proportionately con-
sumed by individuals with high net social marginal utility of income. We
also show that both myopic and farsighted individuals benet more from the
second-best policy when the proportion of myopic agents in society increases.
Our paper is related to the literature on present-biased preferences, such
as ODonoghue and Rabin (2003 and 2006), Gruber and Koszegi (2001 and
2004), Diamond and Koszegi (2003) and Cremer et al. (2009). These papers
also assume that individuals use time-inconsistent preferences and study how
these inconsistencies can be mitigated through tax instruments. The main
di¤erence with our paper is that they assume that individuals do not care (or
care too little) about all components of their future utility while we assume that
1The paper closest to ours is Diamond and Mirrlees (2000). Our approach di¤ers from
theirs in two ways: they focus on saving and not on labor supply and they do not examine
the tax policy implications of habit formation.
2We measure aggregate welfare as the sum of individuals long termpreferences  i.e.,
the preferences that individuals use in the second period of the game. Observe that since
individuals regret their myopia when old, they are ultimately thankful to the planner for
having inuenced their choices. This is line with the cautious (ODonoghue and Rabin,
1999) or asymmetric(Camerer et al., 2003) paternalism advocated in the literature. Note
that our approach assumes that the true parameter relating past and future consumption
is known to the government. A di¤erent analysis would emerge if this parameter could only
be inferred from observation of individual choices (as in Bernheim and Rangel, 2009).
3The psychology literature dubs this inability to forecast future preferences projection
bias.
individuals do not correctly forecast the e¤ects of their current consumption
on their future utility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the basic model
along with the laissez-faire and the rst-best solutions (including decentraliza-
tion) in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the second-best analysis, assuming
that all individuals are myopic. Section 4 presents simulations of our model
where society is composed of both myopic and farsighted individuals.
2 First-Best and Decentralization
2.1 The model
The economy we consider consists of a continuum of individuals di¤ering in
their wage or productivityw. Each individual works one unit of time in the rst
period of his life and earns w. This income is divided into current consumption,
c, and saving, s. In the second period, he works an amount of time `, and earns
w`.4 We assume without loss of generality a zero interest rate, so that total
second period income is equal to w` + s and is devoted to second period
consumption, d.
Individual utility is given by
U (c; d; `) = u (c) + v (d; c)  h (`) ;
where v (d; c) is the utility from second period consumption that depends on
rst period consumption as well. We assume that u is strictly concave and h
strictly convex, while v(d; c) is strictly concave and increasing in d. Our habit
formation assumption implies that vc < 0 and vdc > 0, so that previous period
consumption reduces second periods utility and generates additional needs.5
Myopia is represented by the fact that in the rst period of their life,
individuals do not see this delayed e¤ect of consumption. Consequently, when
they choose saving and their projected retirement age they use a di¤erent
expression for the second period utility, namely v(d; 0). A farsighted individual
would have a correct perception of such a habit formation, that is v(d; c).6
4As is standard in the optimal taxation literature, we consider implicitly a linear pro-
duction function with labor as its sole input. Individuals di¤er in the productivity of the
labor they supply.
5An alternative specication is to assume vc > 0, which implies that previous consump-
tion brings status and hence additional utility.
6By restricting our setting to two periods, we reduce the self-control problem to its
simplest expression. This is the price to pay for simplicity. Further, we assume that our
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that v is given by
v(d; c) = u (d  c) ;
where  = 0 for myopic individuals in the rst period of their life, while  = 
is the true value of the parameter (used by myopic individuals in the second
period, and by farsighted in both periods).7
In the remainder of this section, we rst solve the individualsoptimization
program in the absence of government intervention, and compare a myopic
individuals consumption, saving and labor supply choices with the choices
he would have made had he been farsighted. We then introduce government
intervention and determine the rst-best solution. We then analyze how this
rst-best allocation can be decentralized using consumption taxes together
with individualized lump sum transfers.
2.2 Laissez-faire allocation
We rst study the impact of myopic behavior on consumption and retirement
decisions in the absence of government intervention, starting with the rst
periods optimization. Although the only decision taken by individuals in
the rst period is how much of their exogenous income to consume and to
save, to solve this problem they must anticipate their second periods labor
supply decision and their future marginal utility from consumption. With
our formulation and using the budget constraint, the rst period optimization
problem of an individual with wage w can then be written as
max
s;`
u(w   s) + u(w`  w + (1 + )s)  h(`);
where a myopic individual mistakenly uses  = 0 while a farsighted would use
the correct value of  = . The FOCs are given by
[se] :  u0(w   se) + (1 + )u0(w`p   w + (1 + )se) = 0 (1)
[lp] : wu0(w`p   w + (1 + )se)  h0(`p) = 0: (2)
myopic agents are partially sophisticated as they acknowledge their perception error in the
second period of their life.
7For simplicity, we assume that individuals are either farsighted (use the correct value
of  in both periods) or fully myopic (use  = 0 in the rst period), but our model could
accommodate any intermediate degree of myopia (i.e., individuals using any value of 
such that 0   <  in the rst period). The analysis up to (and including) section 2.3
remains indeed unchanged with people di¤ering in their degree of myopia as well as in their
productivity. Also, we could generalize the model to a setting where habit formation di¤ers
from one individual to another (i.e., agents di¤er also in their value of ), but this would
complexify the model without adding signicantly to the intuition of the results.
The solution to these equations gives the e¤ective value of saving se (and thus
of consumption ce) in the rst period and the planned second period labor
supply `p (and thus also the planned second period consumption dp).
The appendix shows that saving increases with , so that a myopic in-
dividual saves less and consumes more in the rst period than a farsighted
individual of the same wage w. This is intuitive, since the myopic individ-
ual under-estimates the needs that rst period consumption creates later on.
However, the sign of the derivative of `p with respect to  is ambiguous.8 On
the one hand, for any given rst period consumption/saving level, the myopic
individual under-estimates his second period marginal utility and thus plans
to supply less labor than the farsighted individual. On the other hand, the
myopic individual saves less than the far-sighted individual, which lowers his
second period consumption for any given labor supply and drives him to plan
to supply more labor than the farsighted.
Formally, solving simultaneously the FOCs (1) and (2) and denoting by ce
the e¤ective rst period consumption, we obtain that
u0(ce)
1 + 
w = h0(`p): (3)
For a given `p, the numerator of the left-hand side of (3) increases with  (as
ce = w   se decreases with ) while the denominator is also increasing in ,
so that it is not possible to sign the derivative of `p with respect to .




u [w`  w + (1 + )se]  h(`);
which yields the following rst-order condition:
wu0 [w`e   w + (1 + )se] = h0(`e): (4)
The solution to this problem gives the e¤ective second period consumption de
and labor supply `e.
Observe that condition (4) is identical to (2) for farsighted individuals:
their realized and planned labor supplies are identical. Myopic agents, how-
ever, have a di¤erent behavior. They realize in the second period that the true
value of  is  and that they did not save enough in the rst period.
From (4), it is easy to see that the optimal value of ` decreases with s. As
we know that a myopic individual saves less than a farsighted one, we obtain
8If myopia would concern not only habit formation but the whole perception of the future
(instead of u(d; )  h(`) we would have (u(d; c)  h(`))), this would be di¤erent.
that the e¤ective labor supply of a myopic individual is larger than the one of a
farsighted individual. The intuition for this result is that a myopic individual
under-estimates his second period needs and does not save enough in the rst
period. Consequently, he has to work more than planned, and also more than
a farsighted individual. In other words, myopia leads to prolonged activity.9
The comparison of second period consumption between a myopic and a
farsighted individual is also ambiguous. On the one hand, myopic agents save
less, which drives them to consume less in second period. On the other hand,
we have just shown that they work more than farsighted individuals, which
leads them to consume more. The net impact of myopia on second period
consumption depends upon the relative concavity of the utility function and
of the utility derived from leisure. Expressing (4) in terms of second period
consumption, we obtain that
wu0 [de   w + se]  h0(`e) = 0: (5)
Recall that the only di¤erence between a myopic and a farsighted agent in
the second period is their amount of saving se. Applying the implicit function




) = sign(wu00(de   w + se) + h00(`e));
where the sign of the rst term in the right hand side is negative while that of
the second term is positive. If u00(:) is very large (in absolute term) compared to
h00(:), myopic agents work a lot more than the farsighted and end up consuming
more in the second period. If h00(:) is very large, the labor supply di¤erence
between myopic and farsighted agents is small enough that myopia leads to
lower consumption levels in second period for the myopic.
We summarize the comparison of laissez-faire choices by myopic and by
farsighted individuals earning the same wage rate w in the following Proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1 In a laissez-faire situation, the comparison of the optimal
choices of myopic and farsighted agents earning the same wage w runs as
follows:
9In a model with more than two periods one would have the additional issue of learning
about habit formation. As time passes, individuals are forced to revise the age at which they
plan to retire, so they may end up learning that they form habits and start to introduce this
issue in their optimization problems. Studying the e¤ect of learning about habit formation
is out of the scope of this paper. Moreover, learning would only a¤ect our qualitative results
if it is very fast. If learning is not too fast, the qualitative implications of our model that
individuals under save and end up retiring later than optimal will continue to hold.
(i) Myopic agents save less and consume more in the rst period;
(ii) The myopics planned labor supply may be larger or smaller than the
(planned and e¤ective) labor supply of the farsighted. It is larger when the
marginal utility curve is close to at;
(iii) The e¤ective labor supply of a myopic is larger than the farsighteds;
(iv) Myopic agents consume more than farsighted agents in the second pe-
riod if the concavity of the utility function is large compared to the convexity
of the disutility from working, and vice versa.
2.3 First-best
The previous section has shown that myopic agents make choices that di¤er
from the ones they would have made had they been farsighted. These di¤erent
choices are due to mistakes made in the rst period optimization, when they
underestimate the habit formation process. They thus come to regret their
rst period decisions when they enter the second period and observe the true
extent of habit formation. Based on this regret, there is a paternalistic case
for government intervention. In this section, we assume that the social plan-
ner observes the productivity of each individual and their degree of myopia,
but imposes to all the preferences of the farsighted individuals in both periods.
Since all individuals share by assumption the same habit formation technology
(i.e., they all exhibit the same ), and since we look at the rst-best optimal
allocation, this allocation does not depend on the individuals degree of my-
opia: individuals di¤ering only in their degree of myopia will receive the same
rst-best allocation from the planner. The allocation received will typically
depend on the individuals productivity, so we need to know how wages are
distributed. We take w to be continuously distributed on [w ; w+] according
to F (w).
We denote by c(w), d(w) and `(w), respectively, the rst period consump-
tion, second period consumption and labor supply of an individual of produc-
tivity w. The social planners problem consists in nding the schedules c(w),
d(w) and `(w) that maximize the integral of the individuals utility (using








(w + w`(w)  c(w)  d(w)) dF (w);
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the aggregate budget constraint.
This optimization program leads to the FOCs:
[c(w)] : u0(c(w))  u0(d(w)  c(w)) = ; (6)
[d(w)] : u0(d(w)  c(w)) = ; (7)
[`(w)] : h0(`(w)) = w (8)
where the asterisk () denotes the optimal rst-best consumption and labor
supply schedules.
We then obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The rst-best allocation is such that:
(i) The planner equalizes marginal utility of consumption across consumption
goods c and d for all individuals. The marginal utility of rst period consump-
tion c takes into account its full impact, including the one materializing in the
second period;
(ii) The consumption (in the same period) of individuals of di¤erent produc-
tivities is equalized: c(w) = c and d(w) = d;
(iii) Habit formation implies that consumption in the second period is higher
than in the rst period;
(iv) Labor supply increases with productivity: more productive individuals re-
tire later than less productive ones.
Proof. Statements (i) and (ii) follow directly from (6) and (7) while statement
(iv) comes from (8). As to (iii), we obtain from (6) and (7) that
u0(c(w)) = (1 + )u0(d(w)  c(w));
from which we conclude that u0(c(w)) > u0(d(w)  c(w)); so that c(w) <
d(w)  c(w): This in turn means that c(w) < d(w) as claimed.
2.4 Decentralization of the First-Best allocation
We now turn to the decentralization of the rst-best allocation. Decentraliza-
tion consists in designing taxes and transfers that will induce individuals to
take the socially optimal consumption and labor supply decisions. As indi-
vidual choices depend on the individualsdegree of myopia, we have to make
an assumption on the distribution of myopia in the economy. We take the
simplest framework and we assume from now on that all individuals are fully
myopic (i.e., use  = 0 in their rst period choices).10 We also assume in this
10This assumption is made for simplicity reasons. The assumption of a nul  is minor;
what is less minor is to assume that everyone has the same myopia. Ideally, we would like
section, as is traditional, that the planner can observe individuals incomes.
Finally, we assume that the planner controls three instruments: a tax on rst
period consumption,  c; a tax on second period consumption,  d and a lump
sum transfer T (w) that, for the time being, may depend on wage.
Faced with these taxes and transfers, the rst period problem of a myopic
individual of wage w is to maximize:
u (c) + u (d)  h (`)  1 [c (1 +  c) + dp (1 +  d)  w (1 + `)  T (w)] ;
where 1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with his budget constraint.
Consequently, e¤ective rst period consumption ce and planned second period
consumption dp and labor supply `p must satisfy
[ce] : u0 (ce) = 1 (1 +  c) ; (9)
[dp] : u0 (dp) = 1 (1 +  d) ; (10)
[`p] : h0 (`p) = 1w: (11)
In the second period, the individuals problem is to maximize
u (d  ce)  h (`)  2 [d (1 +  d)  se   T (w)  w`] ;
where 2 is the Lagrange multiplier (which is di¤erent from 1) associated
with the individuals second period budget constraint. The e¤ective second
period consumption and labor supply must satisfy the FOCs which are given
by
[de] : u0 (de   ce) = 2 (1 +  d) ; (12)
[`e] : h0 (`e) = 2w: (13)
To achieve the rst-best, the planner needs to induce the (myopic) individuals
to save the appropriate amount. From there on, the choice of retirement age
will be optimal. To obtain the right(rst-best) level of saving, we combine
(6), (7),(9) and (10), keeping in mind from Proposition 1(iii) that c(w) = c
and that d(w) = d, to obtain
1 +  c
1 +  d
=
(1 + )u0 (d   c)
u0 (d)
:
to consider a society in which people di¤er in both productivity and myopia with some
correlation between the two. But this would make the analysis much more complicated
than it already is. In Section 4, we study numerically the case where a fraction  of society
is composed of myopic individuals.
Proposition 3 In order to implement the rst-best allocation, the planner
needs only a tax on the rst period consumption supplemented by the lump
sum tax transfers T (w). More specically, one needs
 c =
(1 + )u0 (d   c)  u0 (d)
u0 (d)
> 0 with  d = 0: (14)
In words, to decentralize the rst-best solution, we need a Pigouvian tax on
rst period consumption. With heterogenous individuals, decentralization also
calls for individualized transfers T (w) in order to equalize marginal utilities
across agents. Alternatively, one can also subsidize second period consumption
to decentralize the rst-best, but in that case one also must subsidize labor
supply to leave the second period consumption/labor trade-o¤ undistorted.
Finally, observe that, if society were composed of both myopic and far-
sighted individuals, and if the type of individuals were observable, the planner
would not want to impose consumption taxes on farsighted agents but only
on myopic individuals. Decentralization in a mixed society would then im-
ply the same consumption taxes as those discussed in this section for myopic
individuals together lump-sum transfers for both types of individuals. We
treat numerically the case where individual myopia is not observable by the
government in Section 4.
In the next Section, we study the case where the planner cannot observe
the productivity level of individuals in a society made exclusively of myopic
agents.
3 Second-best
As we have just seen, the planner can achieve the rst-best optimum with
tax  c and individualized transfers T (w). This requires that the planner is
able to observe an individuals type (wage and rst period income) and to
condition individual lump sum transfers upon it. This is an especially strong
assumption, which we now lift in order to move to the second-best realm where
we assume that the lump sum transfer is the same for all individuals and is
denoted by T . Furthermore, we restrict our attention to linear tax instruments
on expenditures c and d. The government budget constraint then implies11
T =  cEc+  dEd:
In such a setting, we expect that the two taxes will play two roles: a corrective
Pigouvian role (positive for  c; negative for  d) and a redistributive role (the
taxes are used to nance the lump sum transfer). Given that both c and d are
normal goods (increasing with w), such taxes are indeed redistributive.12
We continue considering a society where all individuals are equally myopic;
we leave the case of a society where myopic and farsighted individuals coexist
to Section 4. In the rst period, an individual with productivity w maximizes:
u (c) + u

1
1 +  d
(w + w`+ T ) 

1 +  c




  h (`) : (15)
This yields the e¤ective level of ce and a planned value of second period labor
supply `p: Both are functions of tax instruments and yield a planned value for




1 +  d
(w + w`+ T ) 

1 +  c





  h (`) ; (16)
to determine the e¤ective levels of second period consumption and labor supply
de and `e which are di¤erent from the planned ones dp and `p.
As above the social planner chooses the tax instruments  c;  d and T with
the preferences of (hypothetical) farsighted individuals in his objective func-
tion but taking into account the actual demand and supply functions of myopic
agents. The Lagrangian expression associated with the problem of the social
planner is thus given by
L = E

u (ce) + u

1
1 +  d
(w + w`e + T ) 

1 +  c







 E (T    cce    dde) ;





12The fact that we do not tax wage income is without loss of generality. From the individ-
uals budget constraint, a linear income tax is equivalent to a uniform tax on expenditures.
We can thus normalize the tax on income to zero and put all the taxes on the expenditure
side. This argument also shows that the endogeneity of labor supply is a crucial ingredient
to our second-best analysis. When ` is constant, a tax on income has not deadweight loss
and consequently the taxes on c and d do not produce any distortions.
where  is the multiplier associated with the aggregate revenue constraint and
ce, de and `e now represent the individual choices given the policy instruments.
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Using (9) and (10) we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In a second-best setting where the planner awards the same
lump sum transfer to all agents irrespective of their income, the optimal level
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 d
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 c
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The term  reects the cost of myopia in terms of ex post utility. It tends
to 0 when  is not equal to 0 but tends to . The term b is quite standard in
the linear taxation literature; it is what Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) call the
net social marginal valuation of income. It is measured in terms of government
revenue. It is net in the sense that the e¤ect of a lump sum transfer includes
the direct e¤ect on individual utility but also the indirect e¤ect on tax revenue.
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13Note that the FOCs do not involve derivatives of ` because for ` the envelope theorem
applies. As a consequence of individualsmyopia, we cannot use the envelope theorem for
the choice of rst period consumption.
Replacing all Marshallian price e¤ects by their equivalent decomposition
in Hicksian price e¤ects and income e¤ects (the Slutsky equation) these FOCs
can be written as




























where ece and ede are the compensated demand functions. To get more intuition,
let us rst consider the case when only one of the consumption taxes (either
 c or  d) is available.
Proposition 5 In a second-best setting where the planner uses a single tax
on consumption together with a lump sum transfer, the optimal value of the





























when  c = 0: (18)
First of all, if  = 0, namely if there is no myopia, we only have the rst
part of these formulas, that is standard in optimal consumption tax with het-
erogenous individuals. The numerator reects the redistributive objective; it
is negative as the covariance between consumption and the marginal utility
of income is negative. This term would be zero with identical individuals or
without concern for redistribution (linear utility). The denominator is also
negative and reects the e¢ ciency e¤ect (deadweight loss). The tax and thus
redistribution will be larger if the (compensated) demand for c or d is inelas-
tic.14
Note that if the rst part of (17) were equal to zero, we would end up with





14As usual, the expressions we obtain for the optimal taxes are rules rather than the
optimal levels. This is standard in the optimal taxation literature.










If we assume that c and d have the same redistributive pattern (same covari-
ance between marginal utility of income and consumption) and the same price
elasticity, two reasonable assumptions, one can state that  d <  c if the two
taxes are used alone.
Let us now turn to the case when the two taxes are used together.
Proposition 6 In a second-best setting where the planner taxes both rst pe-
riod and second period consumption together with a lump sum transfer, the
optimal value of the consumption taxes is given by:
 c =
cov (b; ce)E @
~de
@d
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These are very complex formulas. Note that in the case where cross deriv-
atives @ ~de=@ c and @~ce=@ d are negligible, we return to expressions (17) and
(18). In other words, what makes these formulas (19) and (20) di¤erent is the
di¤erent cross e¤ects.
Note that the expressions for  c and  d have the same denominator which
measures the ine¢ ciencies introduced by the tax system. This denominator
is equal to the determinant of the Slutsky matrix and consequently we can
expect it to be positive. Focusing on the numerators, they include a positive
equity e¤ect (the numerator of the rst fraction) and a corrective e¤ect (the
numerator of the second fraction). Both e¤ects are intuitive and very simi-
lar to what happens when only one of the taxes is present. The rst e¤ect
(positive for both  c and  d) is related to equity since the covariances mea-
sure inequality in consumption. With cross-price e¤ects, we have to take into
account covariances between marginal utility of income and consumption in
both periods for both taxes. The second e¤ect is related to myopia since it is
proportional to . The presence of cross-price e¤ects makes it di¢ cult to sign
this term.
An interesting case emerges when the form of the utility function implies
demand functions which exhibit multiplicative separability.
Proposition 7 Suppose (compensated) demand functions can be written as
ece = c(w) c( c;  d) and ede = d(w) d( c;  d): (21)
In this case, in a second-best setting where the planner taxes both rst period
and second period consumption together with a lump sum transfer, the optimal
value of the consumption taxes is given by
 c =
cov (b; ce)E @
~de
@d
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In this special case, only the tax on rst period consumption includes a
Pigouvian term and the taxation of second periods consumption is only used
for redistribution. The Pigouvian term is positive, meaning that the tax on the
rst periods consumption is higher in the presence of myopic habit formation
than when this type of behavior is absent.
This can be stated in terms of the so-called principle of targeting (Sandmo,
1975) which says that to correct for the consequences of externalities Pigouvian
terms appear only in the expressions for the taxes of the externality generating
goods. The expressions for the other goods are not a¤ected.15 One can see
myopic behavior as generating an externality from one self to another one.
The reason that the principle of targeting found by Sandmo does not hold in
the general model in this paper is that it applies only to atmosphere exter-
nalities, i.e., to situations where the externality depends only on aggregate
consumption. When externalities are not of the atmosphere type, the principle
of targeting does not apply as happens in the general formulation in this paper
(unless we have multiplicative compensated demand functions as specied by
(21)).
The analysis up to now has assumed that everyone in society was myopic.
We now move to the case of heterogeneous societies where myopic coexist
with farsighted agents. The analytical treatment of this problem is indeed
extremely complex and the ensuing formulas are not very intuitive, so that we
rather provide numerical simulations.
15But the level of the tax rates is a¤ected.
4 Numerical simulations
In this section, we assume that a proportion  of individuals are myopic (all
with  = 0) while the remaining fraction 1    are farsighted. We assume
that  = 1=4; u(x) = ln(x) and that h(x) = x2=2: Table 1 presents the
results obtained when all individuals have the same wage, w = 2. Like in the
theoretical sections, social welfare is given by the sum of indivuals utilities
(utilitarian welfare function).
The rst two numerical columns report the laissez-faire allocation (the rst
one for a farsighted agent, the second one for a myopic) dened in Subection
2.2. We know from Proposition 2 that rst-period consumption c is larger for
the myopic agent (since he saves less), that e¤ective labor supply ` is larger
for the myopic, and that utility U is larger for the farsighted. The comparison
of planned labor supply of the two types of agents was ambiguous in gen-
eral. With the functional forms we have chosen, the two e¤ects of myopia on
planned labor supply cancel out: farsighted and myopic agents have exactly
the same planned labor supply, `p. Since farsighted agents consume less (and
hence save more) in the rst period than myopics and plan the same amount
of labor supply in the second period, their planned second-period consumption
dp is larger than for myopic individuals. Even though myopics end up working
more than farsighted agents, their second-period consumption d is lower (since
their saving is lower). As a matter of fact, with our assumption that  = 0,
myopic agents do not save at all in the laissez-faire. When society consists
only of farsighted agents ( = 0), the laissez-faire outcome is also the rst-
best solution; recall that all individuals have the same income for the time
being. If society is composed only of myopics ( = 1), the rst-best allocation
corresponds to the laissez-faire allocation of farsighted individuals. The last
column of Table 1 shows that the rst-best allocation can be decentralized us-
ing a tax on rst-period consumption only. This result (which is a special case
of Proposition 3) is intuitive: by choosing optimally  c, the planner induces
the myopics to consume the rst-best amount in the rst-period. Agents then
make mistakes when assessing their planned second-period labor supply and
consumption levels. However, this is of no relevance for e¤ective labor supply
and consumption. Once individuals have reached their second period, they
realize their mistake and take the correct decisions. This is because they then
return to their long run preferences and because they have been induced to
save the optimal amount.
Intermediate columns in Table 1 report results for mixed societies. As
the proportion of myopics increases, the optimal value of  c increases from
zero (when  = 0) to 38% (when  = 1), while the tax on second-period
Laissez-faire Second-Best
 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
 c 0 0.13 0.23 0.31 0.38
 d 0 0 0 0 0
Type F M F M F M F M M
c 1.600 2.000 1.500 1.831 1.435 1.726 1.390 1.655 1.600
dp 2.400 2.000 2.444 2.069 2.482 2.124 2.516 2.169 2.209
`p 1.000 1.000 0.966 0.966 0.942 0.942 0.922 0.922 0.905
d 2.400 2.266 2.444 2.304 2.482 2.338 2.516 2.369 2.400
` 1.000 1.133 0.966 1.084 0.942 1.049 0.922 1.023 1.000
U 0.663 0.620 0.665 0.631 0.671 0.641 0.678 0.652 0.663
`  `p 0.133 0.117 0.107 0.100 0.095
d  dp 0.266 0.234 0.215 0.201 0.190
Table 1: Numerical results with a single wage level
consumption,  d, remains at zero. This is an interesting result: although, with
mixed populations, the tax on rst-period consumption is no longer su¢ cient
to reach the rst-best allocation anymore, no gain in aggregate welfare is
attained by taxing second-period consumption. Observe that the relationships
detailed above for the laissez-faire situation between the levels of c, dp, `p, d,
` and U of both types of agents all remain valid at the second-best allocation,
whatever the proportion  of myopics. One striking feature of Table 1 is that
the utility of both types increases with . This is not surprising for myopic
individuals: as their proportion in the economy is raised, the second-best
taxation policy becomes increasingly tailored to their needs, with the rst-
best allocation attained when  = 1. Farsighted agents also benet from
being pooled with myopic agents because myopics have a larger rst-period
consumption, and hence pay more tax than farsighted agents of the same wage
level. Farsighted individuals then benet from the redistribution from myopic
consumers, and Table 1 shows that this redistribution e¤ect is larger than the
utility cost created by the distortive  c for the farsighted, and is increasing with
 because a larger value of  increases the optimal value of  c. In other words,
even in a simple world with identical wages, the optimal consumption tax has
redistributive e¤ects (from myopics towards farsighted agents) in addition to
e¢ ciency e¤ects (negative for farsighted individuals as the tax distorts their
choice away from the optimum, and positive for myopics as the tax helps them
internalize their myopia).
As  and  c increase, rst-period consumption c decreases for both types
of agents (and is then smaller than the rst-best level of 1.6 for the farsighted
agents, while remaining larger for the myopics). Beyond discouraging rst-
period consumption, the tax  c decreases labor supply (both planned `p and
e¤ective `) and increases second-period consumption (also, both planned dp
and e¤ective d) for both types of agents. Interestingly, the di¤erence between
planned and e¤ective labor supply of myopics, `   `p, and between planned
and e¤ective second period consumption of myopics, d dp, both decrease as 
increases. This result is intuitive as it shows that, as the proportion of myopics
is raised, the second-best optimal policy manages to increasingly alleviate the
myopia problem, as measured by the di¤erence between planned and e¤ective
variables. The fact that the utility level attained by the myopics is always
lower than the one reached by farsighted agents, for any value of 0 <  < 1,
is consistent with the fact that second-best policy is too crude an instrument
to perfectly correct for the myopia of agents in heterogenous societies.
We have also performed the same numerical computations (available upon
request) with a larger value of , and we obtain the same qualitative results
(with larger values of the optimal  c, compared with Table 1, for any 0 <  
1).
We now turn to the case where agents di¤er in wages. Table 2 reports
numerical results for the same functional forms as in Table 1, but where the
distribution of wages is bell-shaped and symmetrical around 2  i.e., the av-
erage wage in Table 2 is equal to the uniform wage in Table 1.16
For simplicity, we assume a zero correlation between income and myopia,
so that the income distribution is the same for both types of agents. Table
2 reports the average (over all income levels) consumption, labor supply and
utility levels for myopic and farsighted agents, according to the proportion of
both types in the economy. From the laissez-faire situation, we obtain that
consumption and labor supply levels are linear in wage w, so that their average
levels (reported in the rst two numerical columns) correspond to the levels
reported in Table 1. Utility is not linear but concave in w, so that average
utility is lower than the utility of the average-income individual. Contrary to
Table 1, redistribution across income levels calls for public intervention even
16Income is distributed on the interval [0,4] according to a Beta distribution with para-
meters (2,2).
Laissez-faire Second-Best
 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
 c 0 0.60 0.76 0.88 0.96 1.04
 d 0 0.60 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.52
Type F M F F M F M F M M
c 1.600 2.000 1.390 1.323 1.616 1.286 1.553 1.257 1.501 1.470
dp 2.400 2.000 2.085 2.154 1.823 2.193 1.871 2.250 1.935 1.973
`p 1.000 1.000 0.680 0.665 0.665 0.647 0.647 0.642 0.642 0.629
d 2.400 2.266 2.085 2.154 1.970 2.193 2.007 2.250 2.065 2.097
` 1.000 1.133 0.680 0.665 0.775 0.647 0.749 0.642 0.736 0.719
U 0.383 0.340 0.537 0.551 0.512 0.567 0.532 0.584 0.553 0.573
`  `p 0.133 0.110 0.102 0.094 0.090
d  dp 0.266 0.147 0.136 0.129 0.123
Table 2: Numerical results with symmetrical distribution of wages
in a homogenous farsighted society, as can be seen from the third numerical
column of Table 2. Recall that the social welfare function is utilitarian and that
individual utility functions are stricly concave. The second-best tax is 60%,
both on rst- and second-period consumption. The tax is the same in both
periods since there is no reason to distort consumption choices across periods
for farsighted agents. As  increases,  c increases while  d slightly decreases
(we can show that total tax proceeds increase with ): redistribution across
income levels increases using the tax on rst-period consumption rather than
on second-period consumption. This is intuitive since, as shown in Table 1,
 c helps the increasingly large group in the economy internalize their myopia
problem. As in Table 1, the gap between e¤ective and planned variables for
myopics decreases with . Both tax rates are much larger than in Table 1,
whatever the value of , which is a reection of the added reason to tax
consumption in Table 2, namely redistribution across income levels. As in
Table 1, average utility increases for both myopics and farsighted agents when
 increases, due to the redistribution from myopics to farsighted agents of the
same wage levels, but the average utility of myopics is always smaller than the
average utility of farsighted agents for any 0 <  < 1.
Interestingly, and in contrast to Table 1, the average utility in a myopic
society ( = 1) is, at 0.573, larger than the average utility in a farsighted
society (U = 0:537 when  = 0). To understand this result, we have to
keep in mind that the average utility reported is not the utility of the average-
income individual. The larger redistribution observed in a myopic-only society
(compared to the farsighted-only case) trumps the distortion e¤ect with our
functional forms, resulting in the counter intuitive result of a larger average
utility for myopics than for farsighted agents. In this sense, myopia allows the
social planner to reach a larger value of its objective since it allows for more
redistribution at the optimum.
Finally, we have performed numerical simulations (available upon request)
with the same assumptions, but with a positively skewed distribution of in-
come, keeping the average income constant at 2.17 The qualitative results
reported in Table 2 remain unchanged, the main di¤erence being larger values
of both  c and  d for any value of , which is intuitive since skewing the income
distribution to the right increases the case for redistributive taxation.
The main results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Assume that a proportion  of individuals are myopic (all
with  = 0) while the remaining fraction 1    are farsighted, that  = 1=4;
u(x) = ln(x); and that h(x) = x2=2.
17Income is distributed on the support [0,6] according to a Beta(2,4) distribution.
(A) When all individuals have the same wage (w = 2) we have:
(i) In a mixed society (0 <  < 1), the rst-best allocation can no longer
be decentralized by consumption taxes only.
(ii) The second best calls for a tax on rst-period consumption only; its
rate increasing with .
(iii) As  increases, the second-best optimal policy manages to increasingly
alleviate the myopia problem, as measured by the di¤erence between planned
and e¤ective variables. The utility of both types of agents increases with ,
with farsighted agents benetting from redistribution from (high consumption)
myopics.
(B) When indivisuals di¤er also in income we have:
(i) Public intervention is called for even in homogeneous societies ( = 0 or
 = 1). With a symmetrical and bell-shaped distribution of income around the
same mean as in (A), with no correlation between income and myopia, it takes
the form of the same tax rate on both rst- and second-period consumption
(which is equivalent to a linear income tax).
(ii) As  increases, the tax on rst-period (resp., second) consumption
increases (resp., decreases) and the second-best solution decreases the di¤erence
between planned and e¤ective variables, as in (A) above. Furthermore, the
utility of both types of agents increases with , as in (A).
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the pattern of consumption taxes in a two period model
with habit formation and myopia. The needs individuals have in the second
period increase with their rst period consumption. However, the myopic
individuals do not see this habit formation relation when they take their saving
decision.
Our main results are as follows. In the laissez-faire situation, myopic in-
dividuals consume more in the rst period than if they were farsighted and
end up working more in the second period. Whether they consume more or
less in the second period than if they were farsighted depends on the com-
parison of the concavity of the utility derived from consumption and from
leisure. When individuals di¤er in productivity, the rst-best allocation calls
for more consumption in the second period than in the rst but equalizes
consumption across individuals in each period. This allocation can be decen-
tralized using a tax on rst period consumption together with individualized
lump sum transfers. If these transfers are not available, we show how the
classical formula determining the second-best uniform lump sum transfer is
modied by the introduction of myopia: a term reecting the cost of myopia
in terms of ex post utility has to be added in the computation of the usual
Atkinson-Stiglitz (1980)s net marginal valuation of income. If a single con-
sumption tax is used by the planner in conjunction with the uniform lump
sum transfer, we show that the optimal consumption tax formula consists of
two terms: the classical term trading o¤ the redistributive objective and the
e¢ ciency cost of redistribution, and a term which increases with the ex post
utility cost of myopia. In the case where two consumption taxes are used (one
for each period of consumption), we show how cross price e¤ects a¤ect the
optimal tax formulas obtained above. Finally, in the case of demand functions
exhibiting multiplicative separability, we obtain that the tax on rst period
consumption is corrected by a Pigouvian term and the taxation of second pe-
riods consumption is only used for redistribution. This is in line with Sandmo
(1975)s principle of targeting which says that to correct for the consequences
of externalities Pigouvian terms appear only in the expressions for the taxes
of the externality generating goods.
We nally resort to simulations to deal with the case of a society composed
of both farsighted and myopic individuals, and where the individuals type is
not observable to the planner. We rst consider a society where all individuals,
myopic or farsighted, have the same productivity. We obtain that both types
of individuals get better o¤ at the second-best optimum when the share of
myopics increases. The reason is twofold: myopics are better o¤ because
the second-best policy is more tailored to their needs, while farsighted agents
benet from the redistribution from the higher-consumption myopics. When
productivity heterogeneity is introduced, our simulations show that myopia
allows the planner to redistribute more, and to reach a larger average utility
than with farsighted agents.
In most cases, the optimal tax rates are not the same in both periods
of life. The idea that taxation should vary with age is not new. Banks and
Diamond (2010) following what is called the new dynamic public nance argue
in favor of an age-dependent taxation. Lozachmeur (2006) reaches the same
conclusion, but showing that elderly workers should be subject to a lower tax
than the others because they take both intensive (how many hours a week?)
and extensive (when to retire?) labor supply decisions. In this paper, we
also reach the conclusion that second period consumption should be taxed at
a lower rate than rst periods. The reason is that one has to correct for a
myopic behavior which leads individuals to save too little and forces them to
work longer than initially expected.
Appendix
A Impact of  on savings and labor supply
Di¤erentiating the FOCs (1) and (2) with respect to , and denoting the
derivatives of se and `p with respect to  by se and `
p
, we obtain
u00(c)se + (1 + )u
00(d  c)[w`p + (1 + )se] + u0(d  c)
  (1 + )u00(d  c)[w   se] = 0;
wu00(d  c)[w`p + (1 + )se]  wu00(d  c)[w   se]  h00(`p)`p = 0;
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D = [u00(c) + (1 + )2u00(d  c)][w2u00(d  c)  h00(`p)]
 [(1 + )wu00(d  c)][(1 + )wu00(d  c)] > 0
and
R =  u0(d  c) + (1 + )u00(d  c)[w   se] < 0:
From there, it is easy to show that se > 0, since its numerator is equal to
[ u0(d  c) + (1 + )u00(d  c)[w   se]][w2u00(d  c)  h00(`p)]
  (1 + )w2(u00(d  c))2[w   se] =
  u0(d  c)w2u00(d  c) + (1 + )w2(u00(d  c))2[w   se]
 Rh00(`p)  (1 + )w2(u00(d  c))2[w   se] =
  u0(d c)w2u00(d c)  [ u0(d c) + (1+)u00(d c)[w  se]]h00(`p) =
  u0(d  c)w2u00(d  c) Rh00(`p) > 0:
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